- The State Department ascertained that institutional support in Honduras for the removal and arrest of Zelaya was practically unanimous and remained firm, despite the sanctions and the cancellation of visas. The legislative and judicial branches, the churches, the army and, according to polls, 80 percent of the population preferred to see Zelaya away from power.
- The report from the legal department of the Library of Congress about Zelaya's removal, requested by a legislator, left no margin for doubt: Zelaya had been separated from his post and replaced by Micheletti in accordance with Honduran legislation. To expel him from the country surely was illegal (perhaps they might have put him in jail) but to demand his restitution was tantamount to asking Hondurans to break the law.
- The new government of Honduras had skillfully transferred the debate to the bosom of U.S. society through Republican representatives and senators, and the Obama administration was paying a political price at home for maintaining an antidemocratic stance that was contrary to the interests and values of the American people.
- Circulating through the State Department were two pages compiled by U.S. intelligence that listed the purported crimes and complicities of Zelaya's most intimate entourage with drug trafficking and corruption. It made no sense for Washington to join that side while it maintained in Honduras the Palmerola military base, which presumably was dedicated to watching and combatting activities akin to those of the relatives and friends of its controversial protégé.
- Nor did it make sense to give artificial life-support to a regime that openly militated in the camp of Hugo Chávez, a political family allied with Iran. By associating with Iran and supporting Teheran in its development of nuclear weapons, Chávez, who until recently was classified as a colorful nuisance, became a dangerous enemy.
Source: Miami Herald